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The privacy amplification term, of which the lower bound needs to be estimated with the decoy-
state method, plays a positive role in the secure key rate formula for decoy-state quantum key
distribution. In previous work, the yield and the bit error rate of single-photon state are estimated
separately to gain this lower bound. In this work, we for the first time take the privacy amplification
term as a whole to consider this lower bound. The mathematical description for the correlation
between the yield and the bit error rate of single-photon state is given with just two unknown
variables. Based on this, we obtain the global estimation of this lower bound for both BB84 protocol
and measurement-device-independent protocol. The results of numerical simulation show that the
global estimation can significantly improve the performance of quantum key distribution.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.81.Gs, 03.67.Hk
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) based on the laws
of quantum physics can theoretically present an uncondi-
tionally secure communication [1–3]. However, there is a
gap between its theory and practice due to the imperfec-
tion in real-life implementation. Particularly, the eaves-
dropper (Eve) can launch attacks aiming at the imperfect
single-photon source and the limited detector efficiency
in practical QKD system [4–9]. By utilizing the decoy-
state method [10–12], the practical QKD setups with an
imperfect single-photon source can be still secure.
To deal with the threat coming from the detectors [13],
several approaches have been proposed. One is device-
independent QKD (DI-QKD) [14] of which the security is
based on the violation of a Bell inequality. However, DI-
QKD con not apply to existing practical system because
a loophole-free Bell test at the moment is still unavail-
able. Another one is measurement-device-independent
quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) [15, 16] based on
the idea of entanglement swapping which can remove all
detector side channel attacks.
The security of BB84 protocol with imperfect devices
is analyzed in [17–21]. The security of MDI-QKD proto-
col is researched in [16, 22, 23]. Some useful formulas are
given to calculate the secure key rate for practical BB84
protocol and MDI-QKD protocol. The privacy amplifi-
cation term makes a positive contribution in these secure
key rate formulas and it can not be measured in the ex-
periment. In asymptotic case, the yield of single-photon
state is basis independent [24–26]. Then the privacy am-
plification term can be calculated in just one basis.
In previous work [27], the lower bound of this term
is obtained by estimating the lower bound of the yield
Y1 of single-photon state and the upper bound of the
bit error rate e1 of single-photon state separately. The
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lower bound of the yield Y1 is estimated from the gain
equations while the upper bound of the bit error rate
e1 is estimated from the quantum bit error rate (QBER)
equations. The yield Yi of i-photon state existing in both
the gain equations and the QBER equations is the link
between the estimation of lower bound of Y1 and that of
upper bound of e1. When Yi is one certain value, the
minimum of Y1 is reached. But the maximum of e1 may
be reached as Yi is another certain value. That is to
say, the lower bound of Y1 and the upper bound of e1
may not be simultaneously reached. Thus, the separate
estimation can just bring a lower bound of the privacy
amplification term instead of the minimum.
Inspired by Wang’s method [12, 25, 28, 29], we give a
mathematical description of the correlation between Y1
and e1 with just two unknown variables. In particular, we
will show that globally estimating the lower bound of the
privacy amplification term is equal to finding the mini-
mum of a bivariate continuous function in a closed area.
Thus the minimum of the privacy amplification term can
be attained with the global estimation and higher secure
key rate can be achieved.
The article is organized as follows. Section II intro-
duces the global estimation of the lower bound of the pri-
vacy amplification term for BB84 protocol. The global
estimation for MDI-QKD protocol will be discussed in
section III. We conclude our work in section IV.
II. THE GLOBAL ESTIMATION OF THE
LOWER BOUND OF THE PRIVACY
AMPLIFICATION TERM FOR BB84 PROTOCOL
The privacy amplification term for BB84 protocol is
given by Y1[1−H(e1)], where Y1 and e1 are, respectively,
the yield and the bit error rate of single-photon state.
Here in this section, firstly we mathematically character-
ize the correlation between Y1 and e1. Then the minimum
of Y1[1 − H(e1)] is given with the method of global es-
timation. Lastly, the numerical simulation is performed
2to make a comparison in performance of QKD protocol
between the global estimation and the separated estima-
tion.
A. The correlation between Y1 and e1
Given a weak coherent state source which sends three
different kinds of optical pulses with intensities ω, υ and
µ (0 = ω < υ < µ), the overall gains which mean the
probability for Bob to obtain a detection event in one
pulse are given by following three equations,
Qµ=
∞∑
i=0
e−µ
µi
i!
Yi, (1)
Qυ=
∞∑
i=0
e−υ
υi
i!
Yi, (2)
Qω = Y0, (3)
where Qν and Yi are, respectively, the overall gain with
intensity ν (ν ∈ {ω, υ, µ}) and the yield of i-photon state.
We denote Eν to be the overall QBER with intensity ν,
ei to be the bit error rate of i-photon state. The overall
QBER equations can be given by
EµQµ=
∞∑
i=0
e−µ
µi
i!
eiYi, (4)
EυQυ=
∞∑
i=0
e−υ
υi
i!
eiYi, (5)
EωQω = e0Y0. (6)
It is important to note that Y0 is equal to the gain Qω
when Alice does not send any optical pulse, which in-
cludes the detector dark count and other background
contributions. As the background is random, we assume
that Eω = e0 = 0.5.
As three equations can only fix three variables, we tem-
porarily take Yi (i ≥ 3) as known variables. Then three
gain equations can be solved according to Cramer’s rule.
Y1 is given by
Y1 =
µ
υ(µ− υ)
(eυQυ − Y0)−
υ
µ(µ− υ)
(eµQµ − Y0) +
∞∑
i=3
(µi−1υ − υi−1µ)
i!(µ− υ)
Yi. (7)
Similarly, e1Y1 can be gained by
e1Y1=
µ
υ(µ− υ)
(eυEυQυ − e0Y0)−
υ
µ(µ− υ)
(eµEµQµ − e0Y0) +
∞∑
i=3
(µi−1υ − υi−1µ)
i!(µ− υ)
eiYi. (8)
From equation (7) and equation(8), we can get that
there are infinite variables Yi (i ≥ 3) simultaneously in-
fluencing the values of Y1 and e1Y1. Then the privacy
amplification term is influenced by infinite variables. It
is computationally infeasible to find the minimum of a
function with infinite variables. Fortunately, we find a
way to reduce the number of unknown variables to two
inspired by Wang’s method [12, 25]. We define a state of
which the density operator is ρ =
∞∑
i=3
(µi−1υ−υi−1µ)
Ωi!(µ−υ) |i〉 〈i|
(Ω =
∞∑
i=3
(µi−1υ−υi−1µ)
i!(µ−υ) > 0). The yield and the bit error
rate of this state can be given by
Yρ=
∞∑
i=3
(µi−1υ − υi−1µ)
i!(µ− υ)Ω
Yi, (9)
eρYρ=
∞∑
i=3
(µi−1υ − υi−1µ)
i!(µ− υ)Ω
eiYi. (10)
Then equation (7) and equation (8) can be rewritten as
Y1 =
µ
υ(µ− υ)
(eυQυ − Y0)−
υ
µ(µ− υ)
(eµQµ − Y0) +
+ΩYρ, (11)
e1Y1=
µ
υ(µ− υ)
(eυEυQυ − e0Y0)−
υ
µ(µ− υ)
(eµEµQµ − e0Y0) + ΩeρYρ. (12)
Thus Y1 and e1Y1 is determined by the gains and the
QBERs which can be measured in the experiment except
the yield and the bit error rate of state ρ. State ρ is
the link between the calculations of Y1 and e1Y1. The
yield Yρ of state ρ as a unknown variable simultaneously
influences the estimations of both Y1 and e1. In [30], Yρ
is set to 0 to get the lower bound of Y1 while eρ and Yρ
are both set to 1 to get the upper bound of e1. Thus the
contradiction that Yρ cannot be simultaneously 0 and 1
emerges.
The quantity of the privacy amplification term is
Y1[1 − H(e1)], which is a bivariate continuous function
of Yρ and eρ. The minimum of the continuous func-
tion on the closed area can be attained. This is one
reason why we should consider the global lower bound of
Y1[1−H(e1)] instead of calculating the lower bound of Y1
and the upper bound of e1 separately. In previous work
[11, 12, 30, 31], the lower bound of Y1 is gained by utiliz-
ing the gain equations. In fact, Y1 also exists in QBER
equations where the information of Y1 is not extracted.
This is another motivation that the global lower bound
of Y1[1−H(e1)] should be considered.
3B. The global lower bound of Y1[1−H(e1)]
According to previous work [11, 12, 30, 31], the most
accurate estimations of Y1 and e1 are given by
Y1 ≥ Y
L
1 =
µ
υ(µ− υ)
(eυQυ − Y0)
−
υ
µ(µ− υ)
(eµQµ − Y0), (13)
e1 ≤ e
U
1 =
(eυEυQυ − e0Y0)
υY L1
. (14)
According to the corollary in appendix, the global lower
bound of Y1[1−H(e1)] can be gained by
Y1(1−H(e1)) ≥ (Y
L
1 + θ)[1−H(
eU1 Y
L
1
Y L1 + θ
)],
θ =
1
µ(µ− υ)
[υ(eµEµQµ − e0Y0)
−µ(eυEυQυ − e0Y0)] > 0. (15)
To make a clear comparison, we denote (Y G1 , e
G
1 ) as the
point where the minimum is achieved. Corresponding to
equation (13) and equation (14), Y G1 and e
G
1 are given by
Y G1 = Y
L
1 + θ, (16)
eG1 =
eU1 Y
L
1
Y L1 + θ
. (17)
Here θ can be considered the information of Y1 coming
from the QBER equations, which is abandoned for the
separate estimation. By globally considering the lower
bound of the privacy amplification term, we successfully
extract it.
C. Numerical simulation for BB84 protocol
With the observed gains and error rates, the final se-
cure key rate can be calculated [17] by
R ≥ pµ1Y1[1−H(e1)]−QµfH(Eµ), (18)
where pµ1 is the probability that Alice sends a single-
photon state pulse corresponding to signal state µ; f is
the error correction inefficiency; H(x) = −xlog2(x)−(1−
x)log2(1−x) is the binary Shannon entropy function. For
a fair comparison, we use the same parameters in [28, 29]
summarized in table I. For simplicity, the detection effi-
ciency is put to the overall channel transmission, hence
we only need to assume the 100% detection efficiency at
Bob’s side.
The ratios of the estimations of Y1 with two methods
(equation (13) and equation (16)) to the asymptotic limit
calculated with the infinite-intensity decoy-state method
are shown in figure 1. The ratios of the asymptotic limit
of e1 to the estimations with two methods (equation (14)
TABLE I. List of parameters for numerical simulation
e0 f pd ed
0.5 1.16 3× 10−6 1.5%
and equation (17)) are shown in figure 2. The ratios of
the secure key rates computed with two methods (sepa-
rate estimation and global estimation) to the asymptotic
limit are shown in figure 3. From the results, we can
see tighter estimations of Y1 and e1 are gained with the
method of global estimation. Thus, higher secure key
rates are achieved.
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FIG. 1. (Color online) The ratio of the estimation of Y1 to the
asymptotic limit calculated with the infinite-intensity decoy-
state method vs the total channel transmission loss for three-
intensity decoy-state BB84 protocol. We set υ = 0.1, µ = 0.5
for decoy state and signal state, respectively.
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FIG. 2. (Color online) The ratio of the asymptotic limit cal-
culated with the infinite-intensity decoy-state method to the
estimation of e1 vs the total channel transmission loss for
three-intensity decoy-state BB84 protocol. We set υ = 0.1,
µ = 0.5 for decoy state and signal state, respectively.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) The ratio of the secure key rate cal-
culated with the three-intensity decoy-state method to the
asymptotic limit calculated with the infinite-intensity decoy-
state method vs the total channel transmission loss for decoy-
state BB84 protocol. We set υ = 0.1, µ = 0.5 for decoy state
and signal state, respectively.
III. THE GLOBAL ESTIMATION OF THE
LOWER BOUND OF THE PRIVACY
AMPLIFICATION TERM FOR MDI-QKD
PROTOCOL
For MDI-QKD protocol, the secure key rate is gained
[16] by
R ≥ pz11Y
z
11[1−H(e
x
11)]−Q
z
µaµb
fH(Ezµaµb), (19)
where pz11 is the probability that Alice and Bob simulta-
neously send single-photon state pulses corresponding to
signal state in z basis; Qzµaµb and E
z
µaµb
are the gain and
QBER when Alice and Bob simultaneously send signal
state pulses; Y z11 and e
x
11 are the yield in Z basis and the
bit error rate in X basis when Alice and Bob simultane-
ously send single-photon state pulses.
The variable values in (19) can be measured in the
experiment except Y z11 and e
x
11. So the major task in
the calculation of secure key rate is estimating the lower
bound of Y z11[1 − H(e
x
11)]. In previous work, to get the
lower bound of Y z11[1 −H(e
x
11)], the lower bound of Y
z
11
and the upper bound of ex11 are calculated separately.
In fact, Y z11 is equal to Y
x
11 in asymptotic setting ac-
cording to [25]. As a result, we will not temporarily dis-
tinguish the basis of Y11 and e11. We will consider the
lower bound of Y11[1−H(e11)] as a whole.
Similarly, in this section we will firstly introduce the
mathematical description of the correlation between Y11
and e11. Then the global lower bound of Y11[1−H(e11)]
is calculated. Lastly, the results of numerical simulation
will be given. The following work is on basis of the three-
intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol [28].
A. The correlation between Y11 and e11
For MDI-QKD protocol, the gain and QBER when Al-
ice (Bob) sends a certain pulse with intensity qa (qb) can
be given by
Qqaqb=
∞∑
i,j=0
e−(qa+qb)
qa
iqb
j
i!j!
Yij , (20)
EqaqbQqaqb=
∞∑
i,j=0
e−(qa+qb)
qa
iqb
j
i!j!
eijYij , (21)
where Yij and eij is the yield and the bit error rate when
Alice (Bob) sends an i-photon (j-photon) state pulse.
Given two weak coherent state sources which send
three different kinds of optical pulses with intensities
(0 = ωa < υa < µa) and (0 = ωb < υb < µb), we
eliminate the unknown variables Y0i and Yj0, then get
e(µa+µb)Q˜µaµb =
∞∑
i,j=1
µiaµ
j
b
i!j!
Yij , (22)
e(µa+υb)Q˜µaυb =
∞∑
i,j=1
µiaυ
j
b
i!j!
Yij , (23)
e(υa+µb)Q˜υaµb =
∞∑
i,j=1
υiaµ
j
b
i!j!
Yij , (24)
e(υa+υb)Q˜υaυb =
∞∑
i,j=1
υiaυ
j
b
i!j!
Yij , (25)
where Q˜µ1,µ2(µ1 ∈ {µa, υa}, µ2 ∈ {µb, υb}) is achieved by
Q˜µ1µ2 =Qµ1µ2 + e
−(µ1+µ2)Qωaωb
−e−µ1Qωaµ2 − e
−µ2Qµ1ωb . (26)
According to [28], Y11 can be solved from equations
(23, 24 and 25),
Y1,1 = Y
L
11 +
∑
(i+j)≥4
Υi,jYi,j
i!j!(µa − υa)(µb − υb)
, (27)
Υi,j = υ
i−1
a µ
j−1
b υb(µa − υa) + µ
i−1
a υ
j−1
b υa(µb − υb)
−υi−1a υ
j−1
b (µaµb − υaυb) > 0,
Y L11 =
1
(µa − υa)(µb − υb)
(
e(υa+υb)(µaµb − υaυb)
υaυb
Q˜υaυb −
e(µa+υb)υa(µb − υb)
µaυb
Q˜µaυb −
e(υa+µb)υb(µa − υa)
υaµb
Q˜υaµb).
(28)
Similarly, e11 can be solved from the corresponding
5QBER equations,
e11Y11 = (e11Y11)
L +
∑
(i+j)≥4
ei,jΥi,jYi,j
i!j!(µa − υa)(µb − υb)
,(29)
(e11Y11)
L =
1
(µa − υa)(µb − υb)
(
e(υa+υb)(µaµb − υaυb)
υaυb
Q˜υaυbE˜υaυb −
e(µa+υb)υa(µb − υb)
µaυb
E˜µaυbQ˜µaυb −
e(υa+µb)υb(µa − υa)
υaµb
E˜υaµbQ˜υaµb). (30)
E˜µ1,µ2Q˜µ1,µ2(µ1 ∈ {µa, υa}, µ2 ∈ {µb, υb}) is achieved by
E˜µ1µ2Q˜µ1µ2 =Eµ1µ2Qµ1µ2 + e
−(µ1+µ2)EωaωbQωaωb −
e−µ1Eωaµ2Qωaµ2 − e
−µ2Eµ1ωbQµ1ωb . (31)
It is easy to verify that Υi,j is positive when (i+j) ≥ 4.
So we can define a state of which the density operator is
ψ =
∑
(i+j)≥4
Υi,j
i!j!(µa−υa)(µb−υb)Π
(|i〉 〈i| ⊗ |j〉 〈j|), where Π
is equal to
∑
(i+j)≥4
Υi,j
i!j!(µa−υa)(µb−υb)
.
Then equation (27) and equation (29) can be rewritten
Y11 =Y
L
11 +ΠYψ, (32)
e11Y11 =(e11Y
L
11)
L +ΠeψYψ , (33)
where Yψ and eψ is the yield and the bit error rate of
state ψ.
Thus Y11 and e11 is linked by the state ψ. Y11(1 −
H(e11)) is a bivariate continuous function with two pa-
rameter variables Yψ and eψ. The lower bound of Y11 can
be gained by setting Yψ to 0 while the upper bound of e11
can be gained by setting Yψ and eψ to 1. Thus the lower
bound of Y11(1 − H(e11)) can not be reached with the
separate estimation. The minimum of Y11(1 − H(e11))
can be attained with the global estimation.
B. The global lower bound of Y11(1−H(e11))
In [28], the lower bound of Y11 is given in equation (28)
by setting the last term in equation (27) to 0. The upper
bound of e11 is given by setting the term eijYij (i+j) ≥ 2
of E˜υaυbQ˜υaυb to 0,
e11 ≤ e
U
11 =
eυa+υbE˜υaυbQ˜υaυb
υaυbY L11
. (34)
According equations (32, 33 and 34) and corollary in
appendix, the global lower bound of Y11(1 − H [e11]) is
given by
Y11[1−H(e11)]≥ (Y
L
11 + δ)[1 −H(
eU11Y
L
11
Y L11 + δ
)], (35)
δ= eU11Y
L
11 − (e11Y11)
L > 0.
To make a clear comparison, we denote (Y G11 , e
G
11) as the
point where the minimum is attained. Corresponding to
equation (28) and equation (34), Y G11 and e
G
11 is given by
Y G11 = Y
L
11 + δ, (36)
eG11 =
eU11Y
L
11
Y L11 + δ
. (37)
C. Numerical simulation for MDI-QKD protocol
Numerical simulations are performed with the param-
eters in table I. The ratios of the estimations of Y11
with two methods (equation (28) and equation (36)) to
the asymptotic limit obtained with the infinite-intensity
decoy-state method are shown in figure 4. The ratios of
the asymptotic limit of e11 to the estimations with two
methods (equation (34) and equation (37)) are shown in
figure 5. The ratios of the secure key rates calculated
with two methods (separate estimation and global esti-
mation) to the asymptotic limit are shown in figure 6.
From the results, we can see tighter estimations of Y11
and e11 are gained with global estimation. Thus, higher
secure key rates are reached.
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FIG. 4. (Color online) The ratio of the estimation of Y11
to the asymptotic limit calculated with the infinite-intensity
decoy-state method vs the total channel transmission loss for
three-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol. We set υa =
υb = 0.1, µa = µb = 0.5 for decoy states and signal states,
respectively.
IV. CONCLUSION
The global estimations of the privacy amplification
term for both BB84 protocol and MDI-QKD protocol
have been researched in this paper. Conventional sepa-
rate estimation will abandon the information of the yield
of single-photon state in QBER equations. With the
global estimation of the privacy amplification term, this
information has been extracted and the minimum of the
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FIG. 5. (Color online) The ratio of the asymptotic limit of
e11 calculated with the infinite-intensity decoy-state method
to the estimation vs the total channel transmission loss for
three-intensity decoy-state MDI-QKD protocol. We set υa =
υb = 0.1, µa = µb = 0.5 for decoy states and signal states,
respectively.
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FIG. 6. (Color online) The ratio of secure key rate calculated
with the three-intensity decoy-state method to the asymptotic
limit calculated with the infinite-intensity decoy-state method
vs the total channel transmission loss for decoy-state MDI-
QKD protocol. We set υa = υb = 0.1, µa = µb = 0.5 for
decoy states and signal states, respectively.
privacy amplification term is achieved. Compared with
separate consideration, more accurate estimations of the
yield and the bit error rate of single-photon state are
gained, which thus significantly improve the performance
of the quantum key distribution for both BB84 protocol
and MDI-QKD protocol. Additionally, more accurate
separate estimation will contribute to more smaller do-
main of the bivariate function which thus can further help
to obtain a tighter global estimation.
APPENDIX
Theorem: For the bivariate continuous function
f(x, y) = (A + Cy)[1 − H(B+Cxy
A+Cy )] (A > 0, C > 0)
with the definition domain {(x, y) : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤ y ≤
1, B+Cxy
A+Cy < 0.5}, the minimum can be attained on the
border.
proof: Firstly, the partial derivatives of function
f(x, y) are given by
fx = −(A+ Cy)H(
B + Cxy
(A+ Cy)
)′
Cy
A+ Cy
, (38)
fy =C[1−H(
B + Cxy
A+ Cy
)]− (A+ Cy)H(
B + Cxy
A+ Cy
)′
(ACx−BC)
(A+ Cy)
2 . (39)
If there is an extreme point (x0, y0) (0 < x0 < 1, 0 <
y0 < 1), then H(
B+Cxy
A+Cy )
′ has to be 0 from the restrict
fx = 0. Combine the restrict fy = 0, we can get C[1 −
H(B+Cxy
A+Cy )] = 0. This is in contradiction with our initial
assumption.
Function f(x, y) for a fixed y is a decreasing func-
tion with parameter variable x. So the minimum can
be reached where x is 1. So this problem is converted to
searching the minimum of univariate continuous function
g(y) = (A+y)[1−H(B+y
A+y )](0 ≤ y ≤ C). Calculating the
derivative function of g(y), we can find
gy= 1−H(
B + y
A+ y
)− (A+ y)H(
B + y
A+ y
)′
(A−B)
(A+ y)2
= 1 + (
B + y
A+ y
) log(
B + y
A+ y
) + (
A−B
A+ y
) log(
A−B
A+ y
)
−(
A−B
A+ y
) log(
A−B
B + y
)
= 1 + log(
B + y
A + y
). (40)
As we assume B+y
A+y < 1/2, then gy < 0. That is to say,
gy is a decreasing function with parameter variable y.
Corollary: For the bivariate continuous function
f(x, y) = (A + Cy)[1 − H(B+Cxy
A+Cy )] (A > 0, C > 0)
with the definition domain {(x, y) : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, 0 ≤
y ≤ 1, B+Cxy
A+Cy < 0.5, (B + Cxy) < D, (A+ Cy) > E},
the nonzero minimum can be obtained in the following
three cases.
case 1: when (D−B) < C and (D−B) > (E−A), the
minimum is f(1, D−B
C
) = (A+D −B)[1 −H( D
A+D−B )].
case 2: when (D − B) < C and (D − B) < (E − A),
the minimum is f(D−B
E−A
, E−A
C
) = E[1−H(D
E
)].
case 3: when (D−B) >= C, the minimum is f(1, 1) =
(A+ C)[1−H(B+C
A+C )].
proof: If we set (B + Cxy) = D, the function f(x, y)
is converted to an univariate continuous increasing func-
tion (A + Cy)[1 − H( D
A+Cy )]. Then it is easy to verify
7the correctness of corollary combining with the proof of
theorem.
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